15
Second, clearly neither Governor Bentley’s life nor his liberty (imprisonment) is at
stake as a result of the entire process under Section 173.
Thus, in arguing for protections under the Due Process Clause, Governor
Bentley necessarily contends that he possesses a
private
property
interest in
holding the highest elected
public
office
in Alabama. This notion has been roundly
rejected by the United States Supreme Court for more than a century.
In
Taylor v. Beckham
, decided in 1900, the Supreme Court held that it lacked
jurisdiction even to consider the merits of a challenge to an allegedly stolen
Kentucky gubernatorial election because the due process clause does not apply to
public office: “The decisions are numerous to the effect that public offices are mere
agencies or trusts, and not property as such…. [T]he nature of the relation of a
public officer to the public is inconsistent with either a property or a contract
right.”
In 1944, the Supreme Court affirmed that holding: “More than forty years
ago, this Court determined that an unlawful denial by state action of a right to state
political office is not a denial of a right to property or of liberty secured by the due
process clause.”
In the decades since, these principles have been applied by courts
nationwide to reject federal due process claims arising from alleged improper denial
of, or removal from, a variety of elected offices.
The Alabama Supreme Court has expressly held that a legislatively-created
public office is not the property of the officeholder.
Furthermore, holding such a
public office under Alabama law never becomes a vested right “as against the right
of the state to remove him.”
“The fact that the Constitution throws a mantle of
protection around a public officer, such as a limit on the power of the legislature to
178 U.S. 548, 577 (1900).
Snowden v. Hughes
, 321 U.S. 1, 6 (1944).
E.g.
,
Wilson v. Birnberg
, 667 F.3d 591, 597-98 (5th Cir. 2012)
cert. denied
, 133 S.Ct. 32 (2012)
(Texas county commission);
LaPointe v. Winchester Bd. of Educ.
, 366 Fed. App’x 256, 257-58 (2nd
Cir. 2010) (Connecticut local board of education);
Velez v. Levy
, 401 F.3d 75, 86 (2nd Cir. 2005) (New
York City community school board);
D’Agostino v. Delgadillo
, 111 Fed. App’x 885, 886 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Los Angeles city attorney);
Parks Miller v. Centre County
, No. 4:15-cv-1754, 2016 WL 2752645, at
*17 (M.D. Pa. May 11, 2016) (Pennsylvania district attorney);
Jennerjahn v. City of Los Angeles
, No.
2:15-cv-263, 2016 WL 1358950, at *12 (C.D. Cal. March 15, 2016) (Los Angeles neighborhood
council);
Copeland v. City of Union, Missouri
, No. 4:15-cv-554, 2016 WL 259379, at *3 (E.D. Miss.
Jan. 20, 2016) (Missouri city tax collector);
Ford v. Donovan
, 891 F. Supp. 2d 60, 66 (D.D.C. 2012)
(District of Columbia public housing council president);
Board of Educ. of Shelby County, Tenn. v.
Memphis City Bd. of Educ.
, No. 11-2101, 2011 WL 3444059, at *56 (W.D. Tenn. 2011) (Tennessee
local board of education);
but see Abrahamson v. Neitzel
, 120 F. Supp. 3d 905, 920-23 (W.D. Wisc.
2015) (acknowledging
Taylor
and
Snowden
but determining that “even if” plaintiff “has a
constitutionally protected interest in the position of [Wisconsin] chief justice,” she received “all the
process that was due” with respect to constitutional amendment changing method of selecting chief
justice).
Moore v. Watson
, 429 So. 2d 1036, 1038 (Ala. 1983).
Id
.